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Abstract: For more than twenty-eight years, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian-Georgian 
relations have been a substantial ground for mutual confrontation, sharp dispute, and a lack of trust. Continuous 
tensions and disagreements have adversely affected efforts to achieve a proper balance in bilateral relations 
between the neighboring countries and resulted in a number of direct and indirect confrontations. Whilst the 
Russian president seeks to restore Russia’s great power status, regain its past glory and control strategically 
important regions of the former Soviet space, Georgia, from the very first day of independence, tries to maintain 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity, develop modern state institutions, strengthen democratic values and 
integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The paper aims to study Moscow’s current foreign policy strategy 
towards Georgia following the ‘Rose revolution’ and argues that Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, in 
August 2008, was a clear illustration of classical realism used by a great power in the XXI century. Russia actively 
uses hybrid warfare and regularly employs economic leverage on Georgia to eventually achieve its political ends 
in the Caucasus region. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The disintegration of the USSR (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) marked the 
end of geopolitical tension between the two greatest superpowers of the so-called „Cold 
War‟ the Soviet Union and the United States whose mutual antagonism lasted for almost 
forty-five years following the immediate afterward of the end of the World War II. The World 
watched in shocked amazement how the Union of fifteen socially, culturally and ethnically 
diverse groups of states fell to pieces in 1991. Francis Fukuyama (1989) argued that a triumph 
of capitalism over socialism after the failure of Communism meant the victory of liberal-
democracy, which would become the last point of socio-cultural evaluation of the society and 
final form of human government. 
During the early years of independence, weak and socially unstable former USSR 
nations faced a number of internal and external challenges to maintain their freedom and 
national identity. Georgia was not an exception; the country with little experience of 
independence was confronted with the issue of reestablishing its prospective place on the 
world stage and redefining a right strategic orientation to the road to democracy and 
sovereignty. The Supreme Council of Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union 
on April 9, 1991. The mentioned period coincided with severe ethno-political tensions in 
Georgia‟s two separatist regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region (Rondeli 
2001). The civil war ended with expelling the first President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
from his homeland and undermined the power of the legitimate government of the country. 
The war drastically weakened Georgia‟s economic development and eventually resulted in 
the so-called unresolved „frozen conflicts‟. Despite the frequent meetings between Eduard 
Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s over the peaceful resolution of the Georgian 
conflicts, the negotiations appeared to be pointless since they inevitably ended in deadlock. 
At the beginning of a new millennium, young charismatic leaders came to power in 
Georgian and Russian political elites, which in turn, hugely deteriorated Russian-Georgian 
relations over again. Since under Saakashvili, Georgia took an obvious pro-Western and anti-
Russian orientation and the president became confident in achieving his political goals 
concerning the NATO, the EU, and the US, shortly afterward it became certainly clear that 
Russia would lose its „sphere of influence‟ in the Caucasus Region and Tbilisi-Moscow would 
no more enjoy Shevardnadze-Yeltsin „honeymoon‟. The conflict between the neighboring 
countries was inevitable (Stent 2015; Sikharulidze 2014). 
Saakashvili-Putin clashes of interest over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia‟s 
aspiration towards Euro-Atlantic structures (the EU and the NATO), and  the „pipeline policy‟ 
of Georgia eventually resulted in the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, which brought 
the relations between the two countries to the lowest point following the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. 
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Power change in Georgia in 2012 marked significant improvements in Russian-
Georgian relations. The new government, under the coalition of „Georgian dream‟, carried 
out a more pragmatic policy towards Moscow aimed at repairing the damaged ties with 
Russia by improving the mistakes made by the cabinet of Michail Saakashvili. Subsequently, 
after the GID (Geneva International discussions), the so-called Abashidze-Karasin negotiation 
format was established in Prague in 2012 as an informal channel for discussing trade and 
humanitarian issues between the two countries. 
However, since 2009 Russia has been pursuing the policy of the so-called „creeping 
annexation‟ in the occupied regions of Georgia. Currently, 20% of Georgia‟s internationally 
recognized territories are under Russian military occupation. The Russian-baked separatist 
forces continuously install and erect barbed-wire border posts in one of the occupied regions 
of Georgia- South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and detain Georgian people under the pretext 
of „illegally crossing the border‟. Fundamental rights of the local population are violated daily 
since the occupants install barbers through people‟s houses, gardens and cultivated lands 
(Modebadze and Kozgambayeva 2019). Thus, Russia‟s war in Georgia in August 2008 was a 
clear illustration of the theory of realism, according to which morality is never acceptable in 
international relations since powerful states show constant desire and continuous necessity to 
engage in war to defend their national interests, ensure the security or simply demonstrate 
the power. On February 10, 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, Russian leader Vladimir 
Putin stated that Russia had a real ambition to re-enter the world politics as a superpower 
and NATO‟s plans for expansion directly opposed the mentioned (President of Russia 2007). 
On December 3, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin again criticized NATO‟s expansion, 
called the function of the organization „pointless‟ following the disintegration of the USSR. 
“NATO expansion posed a threat to Russia”, declared Putin (The Moscow Times 2019). 
The Russian Federation, which still remains a complex phenomenon among the 
world‟s biggest political players, vigorously neglected internationally recognized norms and 
principles of the „Just War Theory‟ and violated the 2/1, 2/4, 2/7 articles of the UN. According 
to article 2/4 of the UN “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat of use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state, or 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. “Nothing contained 
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit 
such matters to settlement under the present charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under chapter VII”- is clearly highlighted in the Article 
2/7 of the UN (United Nations 1945). 
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RUSSIA‟S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GEORGIA  
FOLLOWING THE „ROSE REVOLUTION‟ 
 
Putin‟s rise to power coincided with the so-called „color revolutions‟ in post-Soviet 
space, such as the „Rose revolution‟ in Georgia and the „Orange revolution‟ in Ukraine. Both 
countries aspire to strengthen ties with western Institutions and reduce the dependence on 
Russia. While American-educated, Charismatic leader, Mikhail Saakashvili sought Georgia‟s 
sovereign independence, territorial integrity, and Euro-Atlantic orientation one of the 
fundamental priorities for the country‟s long-term development (Pkhaladze and Silaev 2011; 
Stent 2015, 106; Bedianashvili 2013a; Bedianashvili, Gogiashvili and Pavliasvili, 2016), On the 
other side of the globe, Vladimir Putin entered Russian politics with a strong determination to 
reverse the humiliating decade of the 1990s, recreate strong Russian statehood and restore 
its role as a Great Power. Some were quick to make a parallel between the foreign policy of 
Putin to the one of Joseph Stalin (Sikharulidze 2014, 114). 
Mikhail Saakashvili developed closer ties with the NATO since October 29, 2004, 
through the IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan), according to which Georgia modified 
its political, security and defense system in accordance with the NATO standards. Further 
positive steps had been taken in September 2006, when the NATO-Georgia commission was 
established and Georgia was given a real opportunity to engage in an active dialogue with 
the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2019). Initially, the NATO-Georgia relations 
started in 1992, shortly after Georgia regained independence from the Soviet Union. Georgia 
joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992, whilst the NATO-Georgia bilateral 
cooperation began in 1994 when Georgia joined the partnership for peace program. Mutual 
relations were deepened in 2003, following the „Rose revolution‟ when Saakashvili “pushed 
for more ambitious reforms with the NATO” (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2019). In the 
national security concept of Georgia adopted on May 30, 2005, the following was 
highlighted:  
Georgia as the Black Sea and South-Eastern European state has historically 
been a geographic, political and cultural part of Europe. Therefore, integration 
into European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic and security systems is the 
firm will of Georgian people. Georgia welcomes the NATO and the EU 
enlargement and believes that integration of the Black Sea states into the 
NATO and the EU will significantly reinforce the security of the Black Sea 
Region as the South-Eastern border of Europe. Integration to the NATO and 
the EU represents a top priority of Georgian foreign and security policy 
(Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Georgia 2020).  
 
In response to Saakashvili‟s foreign policy strategy, Russia initiated a full-scale 
economic blockade against Tbilisi. In December 2005, Russia banned Georgian products, 
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including fruits and vegetables to the Russian market under the alleged reason of „violating 
the standards of microbiological composition‟, whilst a year later, in March 2006, Moscow 
banned wine imports from Georgia, which, in turn, negatively affected Georgia‟s economy. 
The Russian embargo caused the economic collapse in Georgia since Russia has been 
Georgia‟s strongest trade partner and it was practically impossible for the country to replace 
the Russian market into the other potential one in the region (see: Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Chronology of Sanctions by Russia  
(Source: Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia) 
 
 
 
Saakashvili‟s pro-western and anti-Russian stance sparked furious reactions in Russia. 
In addition, Georgia‟s pipeline projects further increased the tension between Tbilisi and 
Moscow. As a result of the projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, 
Nabucco, Traceca, White Stream, etc., Georgia has become an important transport hub and 
an essential component of Europe's energy security.  
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The mentioned appeared to be inconsistent with Russia‟s national interest and its 
long-term objectives in the South Caucasus region (Pkhaladze and Silaev 2011, 12). At the 
Munich conference held on February 10, 2007, in Germany, Vladimir Putin strictly criticized 
the US foreign policy and the NATO‟s Eastern enlargement: 
I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the 
modernization of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the 
contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual 
trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? 
And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one 
even remembers them (President of Russia 2007). 
 
As a consequence of several diplomatic meetings, during the NATO summit, held in 
Bucharest, in April 2008, the US supported giving the MAP (Membership Action Plan) to 
Georgia and Ukraine. The fact caused furious reactions in Moscow even the MAP did not 
guarantee the countries acceptance in the Organization (NATO 1949). At the summit, Putin 
declared that the deployment of a powerful military bloc at Russia‟s borders, whose members 
guide their actions by Article 5 of the Washington agreement, would be perceived by Russia 
as a direct threat to its national security.  
On August 8, 2008, when the world‟s attention was focused on the opening ceremony 
of the Olympic Games in Beijing, Russian tanks rolled across the border into the Republic of 
Georgia following the months of violent instabilities between the Georgian and South 
Ossetian secessionist forces in one of the separatist regions of Georgia South 
Ossetia/Tskhinvali region (King 2008, 1-2). The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 ended 
with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states by Russia. The war 
resulted in hundreds of dead humans and brought innumerable damages to Georgian 
economy. Thousands of refugees were forced to leave their homeland. Russian air forces 
bombed and destroyed Georgian air and naval bases, apartment buildings, Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline, etc. (Jodjua 2010). 
Western media was quick to draw a parallel between the political events of 1938-1968 
and Russia‟s War in Georgia. More concretely, when Adolf Hitler invaded Sudetenland and 
Leonid Brezhnev intervened militarily in former Czechoslovakia. As Highlighted by King 
(2008), unlike the historic events of 1938 and 1968, in 2008 “older and more typically Russian 
patterns were at work”. In August 2008, Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev signed a 
document according to which Russia officially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
independent states. The US swiftly responded to the fact. As stated by Bush “The territorial 
integrity and borders of Georgia must be respected, just as those of Russia or any other 
country. Russia's action only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations. In 
accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions that remain in force, Abkhazia 
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and South Ossetia are within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, and they 
must remain so” (The White House 2008). As argued by Popescu  
(…) the paradox is that until August 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had 
been unrecognized but de facto independent states. In August 2008, after the 
war, they were partially recognized, although, in reality, both regions cannot 
be considered more independent than they were before. If the separatist war 
[of the early 1990s] was their „war for independence‟, the war in August 2008 is 
the war that puts an end their limited yet „de facto independence‟.  The winner 
of the war was Russia and not the separatist movements. Both Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are speedily transforming from „virtually independent states‟ into 
territorial entitles of the Russian Federation (Haindrava 2011, 116). 
 
Although the two contradictory narratives have been created about which side started 
the war, on the other hand, it appeared to be certainly clear that 2008 events have been an 
impressive hard power exhibition of Russia. Moscow showed the rest of the world that it still 
considers Georgia „a sphere of its influence‟ and it still maintains its role as a great power 
among the world‟s biggest global players. Russian-Georgian war in 2008 led the Russian-
Georgian relations to the lowest point. The five-day-war has clearly demonstrated that the 
Eurasian continent is still facing serious security dilemmas in the twenty-first century. On 
August 29, in response to Medvedev‟s recognition of the breakaway regions of Georgia as 
independent states, Georgia cut diplomatic relations with Russia. A year later, in 2009 
Georgia withdrew from the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). From 2008 until 
2012 all forms of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia were terminated.  
 
RUSSIA‟S „CREEPING ANNEXATION‟ OF GEORGIAN TERRITORIES AND ITS 
ECONOMICPRESSUREON GEORGIA AS A FORM OF PUNISHMENT 
 
Following the Russian-Georgian war Georgia experienced a deep economic and 
financial crisis. Tbilisi ceased diplomatic relations with Moscow and Russia‟s market for 
Georgia had closed. Yet in 2005-2007 the Russian embargo on major Georgian products, 
including wine and mineral water resulted in the economic downturn in the country, since 
after Turkey, Russia has been and remains the second-largest importer of Georgian products 
near abroad. Moreover, visa restrictions and oppressions on Georgian labor migrants in 
Russia further sharpened the mutual relations between Tbilisi and Moscow. 
Russian-Georgian relations underwent drastic changes under the political coalition of 
the „Georgian dream‟, which won the 2012 parliamentary elections. The new government 
carried out a more pragmatic policy towards Moscow. One of the main objectives of the 
newly elected government of Georgia became to separate political and economic issues 
between the two countries and improve economic relations with Moscow.  
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Bidzina Ivanishvili would repeatedly argue that improved relations with Russia did not 
conflict with Georgia‟s aspirations towards the Euro-Atlantic structures. “Ones, who want the 
closure of Russian market, are Georgian enemies”, insisted Ivanishvili (Interpress News 2019). 
In November 2012, an experienced Georgian career diplomat who had earlier served 
as Georgia‟s ambassador in Moscow, Zurab Abashidze, was appointed a special 
representative of Bidzina Ivanishvili for mutual negotiations with Moscow to restore broke 
diplomatic ties with Russia following the Russian-Georgian war. The format initiated a 
discussion on „humanitarian, trade and economic issues, but also security issues facing both 
Georgia and Russia-terrorism and arms trafficking‟. The mentioned marked the beginning of 
the so-called “Abashidze-Karasin format” (Agenda.ge 2018). As a consequence of frequent 
meetings between Zuran Abashidze and Grigory Karasin, Moscow gradually reopened trade 
ties with Georgia which in turn, made a positive impact on the Georgian economy. Moreover, 
the state Duma welcomed Russian tourists to visit Georgia and recommended Georgian 
resorts (see: Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Money Flowing from Russia to Georgia (Source: The National Statistics Office of Georgia 2019). 
 
According to the National Statistics Center of Georgia, the export of Georgian wine 
and mineral water to the Russian market in 2013 increased by 315% in comparison to 2012, 
while the imports had improved by 24% compared to 2012. The economic profit gained from 
the Russian market has increased in the following years as well. Russian-Georgian bilateral 
trade has improved by 17% in 2016, while in 2017 Georgian wine exports to Russia grew by 
86% (amounted 23.740.750 bottles of wine), which has further increased in numbers in 2018. 
As published by Georgian national wine agency, from 2013 to 2018, after China, Russia was 
the second-largest importer of Georgian wine (see: Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Trade between Georgia and Russia (Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia 2019). 
 
According to the National Tourism Agency of Georgia, more than 1.6 million Russian 
tourists visited Georgia in 2018 out of which each Russian tourist spent approximately 510 US 
dollars while their stays in the country (see: Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Tourists from Russia (Source: National tourism administration of Georgia 2019). 
 
Russia is the third-largest immigrant population country in the world after the US and 
Germany. According to the State Ministry for Diaspora issues of Georgia, based on 2015 
statistics, the total number of Georgians living abroad amounted to 1.607.754 people, among 
whom almost 800.000 Georgians living in the Russian Federation.  
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According to the statistical data, published by the National Bank of Georgia, almost 
half of the total amount of money transferred to Georgia in 2012-2018 came from Russia (see: 
Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Foreign Remittances to Georgia (Source: National Bank of Georgia 2019) 
 
Even Russian-Georgian relations considerably improved in 2012-2018, Russia‟s 
„creeping annexation‟ of Georgian territories has remained one of the major challenges in the 
relations between the two countries. Russia still opposes Georgia‟s Euro-Atlantic integration 
and interferes with the territorial integrity of the country. In 2012, after the power shift in 
Georgia, Russia‟s ambassador to the NATO, Alexander Grushko stated: “As far as Georgia is 
concerned, I am sure that NATO understands the seriousness of consequences that any step 
towards further engagement of Georgia with the alliance, Russia-NATO relations and 
European Security” (Civil.ge 2012).  
Georgia is the NATO‟s one of the closest partners. The country actively contributes to 
the NATO-led operations worldwide. Following the Russian-Georgian war, the NATO 
continues to support Georgia‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally 
recognized borders and calls on Russia to reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as independent states. Currently, Georgia provides valued support for the NATO-led 
operations in Afghanistan (Chitadze 2011b).  
Since 2009, Russia has increased the military forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
and pursued the policy of „creeping annexation‟ in the occupied territories of Georgia. 
Currently, 20% of Georgian territories are occupied by the Russian Federation. Russian-baked 
separatists further move the state border near the Georgian-controlled villages daily. People 
are forced to leave their homes, belongings and cultivated lands that are beyond the 
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occupants‟ demarcation lines. Clear illustrations of Russia‟s oppressive policy are Georgian 
citizens: Giga Otkhozoria, Archil Tatunashavili, and Irakli Kvaratskhelia who were killed by the 
Russian regime in the occupied regions of Georgia. The international community, including 
EU, NATO and US vigorously condemns Russia‟s „creeping annexation‟ in Georgia and call on 
Russia to stop the occupation of a sovereign country and respect the fundamental rights of 
the local civilian population. 
The 2019 anti-government protests in Georgia, also known as „Gavrilov‟s night‟ hit a 
new law point to Russian-Georgian relations and once again demonstrated Russia‟s well-
defined foreign policy strategy in Georgia. Mass protests in Tbilisi began on June 20, when 
Sergey Gavrilov, a member of the Communist Party of Russian Duma visited Georgia to 
participate in Inter-Parliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy. Sergey Gavrilov occupied the 
Georgian Parliamentary speaker‟s chair and delivered a speech in which he enthusiastically 
praised the brotherhood of Georgian and Russian people under the same religious-Orthodox 
Christianity. His speech sparked mass protests in front of the Parliament of Georgia. The 
protests demanded the government‟s resignation with placards: „Russia is an occupier‟. 
Georgian President, Salome Zurabishvili declared that „Russia is an enemy and 
occupier‟. Zurabishvili directly suspected the Kremlin of helping in „stirring the unrest‟ in 
Georgia. As the Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Medvedev stated, Zurabishvili‟s claim was a 
„distortion of reality‟ (National Post 2019). In response to anti-Russian protests in Tbilisi, which 
Russia viewed as „radical Russophobia‟, Putin temporarily suspended direct flights between 
Russia and Georgia, which came into force on July 8 (REUTERS 2019). 
On July 6, Georgian opposition TV host Giorgi Gabunia in his live news show 
„Postcriptum‟ used highly offensive language towards the President of Russia. He insulted 
Putin‟s late parents. Georgian government promptly reacted to the event. Georgia‟s Prime 
Minister condemned Gabunia‟s vulgar rant, and noted: “This is a war by provocateurs against 
their country, a dirty and disgusting game with the security of the state and citizens. (…) He 
[Gabunia] has allowed himself something that is unacceptable for Georgia! This is called 
damaging the interests of one‟s state!” posted Salome Zurabishvili on her Facebook page. 
Gabunia‟s statement caused furious reactions in the State Duma. Top Russian officials 
supported the idea of closing the Russian market for Georgia, by banning the imports of 
Georgian wine and mineral water to the Russian market, as well as banning the remittances 
between the two countries. However, Vladimir Putin opposed the economic sanctions against 
Georgia. “I would not do that out of respect for the Georgian people”, stated the President of 
Russia (First Channel 2019). Furthermore, Russian foreign policy strategy has undergone 
significant transformation in recent years by strengthening a soft power in Georgia which in 
turn, is shaped with Kremlin‟s powerful propaganda. Since the methods and tools used by the 
Russian media are becoming more and more refined and sophisticated in the XXI century 
compared to propaganda used by the Soviet Union, it is one of the effective mechanisms for 
Kremlin to widely spread disinformation and promote pro-Russian and anti-Western rhetoric. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The evaluation of Russia‟s foreign policy towards Georgia clearly shows that the 
Kremlin continuously employs political and economic leverage on Georgia to achieve its 
policy goals in the region. Russia actively uses complex tools and methods to spread anti-
Western and pro-Russian rhetoric across wider society, and undermines Georgia‟s Euro-
Atlantic aspirations. Moscow, directly and indirectly, influences Georgian political actors, 
church, and media and occupies 20% of Georgian territories. Furthermore, Russian-baked 
separatists erect barbed wire fences along the administrative border of the occupied regions 
and detain Georgian people. Paradoxically enough, Russia‟s foreign policy towards Georgia 
has never been straightforward. Following the disintegration of the USSR, every new attempt 
of Georgia to improve the relationship with its Northern neighbor failed due to Russia‟s 
imperial approach towards Tbilisi, which simply demonstrates its „divide and conquer‟ 
strategy in the former Soviet space. 
The paper argued that Russia‟s military intervention in Georgia (August 2008) was a 
clear illustration of classical realism, that is, the hard power exhibition of Moscow. It was a 
direct message to Washington that Russia still maintains its role as a great power among the 
world‟s dominant political actors and still applies „the rule of the jungle‟ to defend its „national 
interests‟. 
From another standpoint, following the war, Russian-Georgian relations remained 
rather strained, filled with mutual suspicion and a lack of trust. Yet, before the war, Russian 
embargo on Georgian products in 2006 adversely affected the Georgian economy since after 
Turkey; Russia has been and remains the second-largest importer of Georgian products near 
abroad. Russian embargo, on the other side, triggered strong debates among the economic 
experts in Georgia that the Russian market would no more bea solid foothold for Georgian 
business in the long run. However, it appeared to be practically impossible for Georgia to 
replace the Russian market by a potential alternative in the region, due to several reasons, 
such as: high demands for Georgian products (especially wine and mineral water) in Russia; 
historical proximity and long-established trade ties between the two countries; and shared 
culture and religious beliefs that are still deeply embedded in the perception of many Russian 
and Georgian people, particularly the old generation who have lived and grown up in the 
Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, Russian foreign policy strategy has undergone significant transformation 
in recent years by strengthening a soft power in Georgia which, in turn, is shaped with 
Kremlin‟s powerful propaganda. Since the methods and tools used by the Russian media are 
becoming more and more refined and sophisticated in the twenty-first century compared to 
propaganda used by the Soviet Union, it is one of the effective mechanisms for Kremlin to 
widely spread disinformation and promote pro-Russian and anti-Western rhetoric. 
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In Georgia, Russia actively manipulates with the following major instruments of hybrid 
warfare: „creeping occupation‟ and de facto regimes; soft power through propaganda; 
information war; and covert operations. Thus, Moscow frequently employs a combination of 
hard power and soft power to achieve its political ends in the South Caucasus and uses 
economic pressure as a „punishment‟ of Georgian people for their „misbehavior‟. As long as 
Russia‟s creeping annexation of Georgian territories and its political and economic pressure 
on Georgia continue, it is highly unlikely Kremlin to change the course towards Tbilisi in the 
foreseeable future. 
It should definitely be emphasized that „creeping annexation‟ is not only an act of 
illegal occupation of Georgian territories, Russia, on the one hand, aims at weakening 
Georgia‟s economy, and on the other hand, tries to increase the dependence of Georgian 
export on the Russian market. Furthermore, Russia interferes with Georgia‟s Euro-Atlantic 
integration and diminishes the status of the country on an international stage by showing the 
rest of the world that Georgia is unable to independently carry out its political course without 
the support of Moscow. 
Under the current tense political relations between Russia and Georgia, it becomes 
certainly clear that the more Georgia increases its ties with the US, the NATO, and the EU, the 
more unpredictable Russia‟s reactions could be in the region, in response. For instance, with 
this scenario, Russia is expected to strengthen pro-Russian forces in Georgia, create political 
instability in the country and undermines its democratic development; or with another 
scenario, Moscow is expected to again impose economic sanctions on Georgia. Tbilisi should 
better prepare for that.  
In light of Russia‟s current foreign policy towards Georgia, there is no reason to 
believe that there will be positive changes in Russian-Georgian relations in the near future. It 
is difficult to foresee a positive dynamic for the peaceful resolution of the Georgian conflicts 
as well. From the mentioned perspective, Georgia should further strengthen its ties and 
increase strategic partnerships with the West and Europe to stand firm against the threats 
coming from Russia. 
In the economic context, the Georgian government should first and foremost take all 
the possible measures to reduce the economic dependence on Russia and furthermore, work 
to diversify Georgian exports abroad. Currently, Georgia has a free trade agreement with the 
EU and China which, in this regard, represents a huge success for the country.  
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